philosophyВестник РГГУ Серия «Философия. Социология. Искусствоведение»RSUH/RGGU BULLETIN. Series Philosophy. Social Studies. Art Studies2073-64012073-6401Russian State University for the Humanities (RSUH)10.28995/2073-6401-2021-3-60-72philosophy-406Research ArticleФИЛОСОФИЯ. ИСТОРИЯ ФИЛОСОФИИPHILOSOPHY. HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHYАргумент антисветимости Т. Уильямсона и проблема знания о себеTimothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument and the problem of self-knowledgeКозыреваО. А.KozyrevaO. A.

Ольга А. Козырева, кандидат философских наук

620002,  Екатеринбург, ул. Мира, д. 19

620028, Екатеринбург, ул. Репина, д. 3

Olga A. Kozyreva, Cand. of Sci. (Philosophy)

bld. 19, Mira Street, Ekaterinburg,  620002

bld. 3, Repina Street, Ekaterinburg,  620028

olgakozyreva@mail.ruУральский федеральный университет имени первого Президента России Б.Н. Ельцина; Уральский государственный медицинский университетРоссияUral Federal University named after the frst President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin; Ural State Medical UniversityRussian Federation202104022022036072Copyright © Козырева О.А., 20222022Козырева О.А.Kozyreva O.A.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://philosophy.rsuh.ru/jour/article/view/406

Данная статья посвящена анализу аргумента антисветимости, предложенного Т. Уильямсоном. Этот аргумент может пониматься как опровержение картезианской концепции знания о себе, где утверждается тезис о привилегированном доступе агента ко всем его ментальным состояниям. Помимо формулировки самого аргумента рассматриваются три вариации возражения одной из его посылок, обосновывающейся принципом надежности знания: во-первых, структура аргумента воспроизводит структуру парадокса кучи, во-вторых, в аргументе не учитывается наличие конститутивной связи между нахождением агента в ментальном состоянии и его знанием об этом, и, в-третьих, само обоснование принципа надежности знания не является достаточным для его принятия. Делается вывод о том, что аргумент антисветимости ставит под вопрос специфику содержания понятия знания о себе в картезианстве.

The paper aims to analyze Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. The argument might be considered as a way to criticize the Cartesian account of self-knowledge, which is based on the thesis of the privileged access agent has to her mental states. First, I present the argument itself as well as the three versions of the main objection to one of the premises. The objection is motivated by the reliability constraint on knowledge: a) the anti-luminosity argument is a sorites argument; b) the antiluminosity argument neglects the constitutive connection between being in a mental state and knowing about being in it; c) the reliability principle itself is not well motivated. Second, I argue that the reliability principle helps the anti-luminosity argument to question the very concept of self-knowledge in Cartesianism.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.