The crisis of the program for building a scientific ontology and the issue of “turn” in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger
https://doi.org/10.28995/2073-6401-2020-1-12-25
Abstract
The article notes that one of the characteristic features of the socalled “turn” in Heidegger’s intellectual biography is his rejection of the initial plan for the creation of scientific philosophy. The denial of such a form means in that case a refusal by the philosopher to construct the planned transcendental ontology, with which the scientific philosophy was initially identified by him. Moreover, the purpose of the article is to show that the “turn” itself is a consequence of the immanent crisis of Heidegger’s program of building scientific philosophy. Its tasks also include identifying the internal motives of that crisis. As a result of the study, it was found that Heidegger’s horizon of understanding of being in general is relativized to the meaning of being of a certain being. Revealingly that the relativization of the meaning of being in general to the meaning of being of a certain being (ontological relativization) in Heidegger’s ontology does not mean the relativization of the being as such to that being (ontic relativization), as is often taken for the philosopher’s conception.
Further, in the fundamental ontology, a horizontal scheme, common to all the horizontal schemata, turns out to be impossible, and therefore, it is difficult here to give an answer to the question about the meaning of being in general – in contrast to the answer to the question about the meaning of a particular way of being, for example, being in existence, understood on the basis of a horizontal scheme of presentation. Finally, in fundamental ontology, the various modes of being identified here do not find a one-to-one correspondence with the structural elements of its meaning, that is, they do not receive a sufficient ontological basis for their, albeit actually already carried out, isolation. Also the article mentions that the crisis of the program of scientific philosophy is not a random event or, moreover, the result of a mistake made by Heidegger. On the contrary it should be understood as a necessary consequence of the original attitude in which the philosopher developed his fundamental ontology.
About the Author
A. B. Patkul’
Saint Petersburg State University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Andrei B. Patkul’, Cand. of Sci. (Philosophy)
bld. 7-9, Universitetskaya Emb., Saint Petersburg, 199034
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Review
For citations:
Patkul’ A.B. The crisis of the program for building a scientific ontology and the issue of “turn” in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. RSUH/RGGU BULLETIN. Series Philosophy. Social Studies. Art Studies. 2020;(1):12-25. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.28995/2073-6401-2020-1-12-25
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