The hard problem of content. The statement of the problem
https://doi.org/10.28995/2073-6401-2021-3-12-25
Abstract
The paper demonstrates that the problem of explaining naturalistically the content of mental states is the hard problem, similar to the hard problem of consciousness. The greater part of contemporary philosophers believe that we can naturalistically explain content within the functionalist paradigm, using for example the concept of information. However, D. Hutto and E. Myin, whose views are analyzed in the work, show that contemporary naturalistic theories that use various concepts of information miss the most essential characteristics of the content associated with the concepts of reference, truth, implication. Hutto and Myin believe that a naturalistic explanation of the content of basic mental states is impossible. The authors correctly diagnosed the issue, but they did not reveal its full hardness. The paper demonstrates that the hardness of explaining the content of mental states is necessitated by clarifying the normative nature of the content from the standpoint of naturalism. The work also analyzes McDowell’s naturalistic approach to understanding the normative character of conscious experience that people have, and notes that we have to expand McDowell’s position in order to include in the explanation the conscious experience of other living beings. It is exactly the expanded version of McDowell’s naturalism that allows us to see the hardness of the problem of explaining the content of mental states.
About the Author
D. V. Ivanov
Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Dmitrii V. Ivanov, Dr. of Sci. (Philosophy)
bldg. 1, bld. 12, Goncharnaya Street,Moscow, 109240
References
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Review
For citations:
Ivanov D.V. The hard problem of content. The statement of the problem. RSUH/RGGU BULLETIN. Series Philosophy. Social Studies. Art Studies. 2021;(3):12-25. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.28995/2073-6401-2021-3-12-25
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