Strawson, responsibility, and emotions

Abstract

This article presents an analysis of P.F. Strawson’s approach to the phenomenon of moral responsibility. First, the crux of Strawson’s approach is introduced. It is then followed by a critique of it. The crux of Strawson’s approach according to my interpretation is (1) to ground being responsible in holding responsible and (2) to ground holding responsible in emotional reactions. I show that although the thesis (1) contradicts the ordinary point of view, it can be defended. I criticize the second thesis and show that there is both holding responsible without emotion and the experience of emotion without holding responsible. Holding responsible without emotion can be accomplished by a non-emotional rational agent as well as by a rational agent who is not well versed in his/her feelings. It is possible to experience emotion without holding anyone responsible if one does not use one’s emotion as a way of blaming or praising. If we can separate emotional responses from holding responsible, then there is no grounding relation between the two. Consequently, we are in a position to reconsider Strawson’s view of moral responsibility.