Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument and the problem of self-knowledge
https://doi.org/10.28995/2073-6401-2021-3-60-72
Abstract
The paper aims to analyze Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. The argument might be considered as a way to criticize the Cartesian account of self-knowledge, which is based on the thesis of the privileged access agent has to her mental states. First, I present the argument itself as well as the three versions of the main objection to one of the premises. The objection is motivated by the reliability constraint on knowledge: a) the anti-luminosity argument is a sorites argument; b) the antiluminosity argument neglects the constitutive connection between being in a mental state and knowing about being in it; c) the reliability principle itself is not well motivated. Second, I argue that the reliability principle helps the anti-luminosity argument to question the very concept of self-knowledge in Cartesianism.
About the Author
O. A. Kozyreva
Ural Federal University named after the frst President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin; Ural State Medical University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Olga A. Kozyreva, Cand. of Sci. (Philosophy)
bld. 19, Mira Street, Ekaterinburg, 620002
bld. 3, Repina Street, Ekaterinburg, 620028
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Review
For citations:
Kozyreva O.A. Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument and the problem of self-knowledge. RSUH/RGGU BULLETIN. Series Philosophy. Social Studies. Art Studies. 2021;(3):60-72. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.28995/2073-6401-2021-3-60-72
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