Incorporeal effects and events in Gilles Deleuze’s “The Logic of Sense” and the concept of λεκτόν in Émile Bréhier’s historico-philosophical reconstruction

Abstract

The article considers the historico-philosophical reconstruction of Stoic concept of a λεκτόν in the work “The Theory of the Incorporeal in Ancient Stoicism” by Émile Bréhier and its reception and development in Gilles Deleuze’s “The Logic of Sense”. The understanding of incorporeal effects and ideal events in “The Logic of Sense” is based on Bréhier’s interpretation of the incorporeal and original concept of a λεκτόν. Λεκτόν attains a special status in Bréhier’s work, occupying the position between physical bodies and language: it is neither a thing, nor a representation, neither a notion, nor a material sign; and also gains independence from the physical connection of causes. Such model of a λεκτόν is developed by Deleuze in several directions: in his philosophy of language, in the mathematical concept of singularities, in the concept of the pre-individual transcendental field of sense, and also in the concept of the unique event Eventum tantum.