Skepticism and Identity. Toward a phenomenology of a neutral meaning

Abstract

The article discusses Husserl’s phenomenological method in the aspect of the ambivalent attitude to skepticism: explicit criticism and implicit convergence with the position of skepticism.

The main thesis of the article is that skepticism as overcoming doubts and neutralizing the positive and negative is Husserl’s main methodological guideline, and the term “epoch” is a designation of a position that combines the theoretical-cognitive principle of the equivalence of givenness in relation to the existence or non-existence of an object with an attempt to present the refusal to engage in any kind of concrete experience as a distinctive experience. At the same time, a distinction is made between the philosophical and the common understanding of skepticism. The author reveals the general presupposition of skepticism: to assume identity as an experience rather than an artificial procedure.

He also analyzes the method of introduction and the status of Husserl’s basic terms “meaning” and “sense” in the context of the “pure logic” project. It is shown that the source of the terms “meaning intention” and “fulfilment of meaning” is the sphere of emotions and feelings. Brentano’s and Husserl’s opposing positions concerning the analogy between judgments and emotions are stated. A consideration is given to Husserl’s assessment of the role of subjectivism and skepticism in overcoming the natural attitude. Contrary to Husserl, who brought together subjectivism and skepticism to the point of identification, an essential difference is made between them. The article criticizes the way of Husserl’s differentiation between the meaning and the object with the help of the assumption of the self-identity of the object with different meanings. In this regard, the well-known Husserl’s examples with Napoleon, the triangle, and the horses which should have served as confirmation of the validity of this difference, are subjected to critical analysis. Two key points of phenomenological skepticism are highlighted: the neutrality of meaning, or sense, in relation to the reality of the object, and the neutrality of the object in relation to its existence or non-existence.